Dissociable effects of valence and arousal in adaptive executive control by Kuhbandner, Christof & Zehetleitner, Michael
Dissociable Effects of Valence and Arousal in Adaptive
Executive Control
Christof Kuhbandner*., Michael Zehetleitner.
Department of Psychology, University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Abstract
Background: Based on introspectionist, semantic, and psychophysiological experimental frameworks, it has long been
assumed that all affective states derive from two independent basic dimensions, valence and arousal. However, until now,
no study has investigated whether valence and arousal are also dissociable at the level of affect-related changes in cognitive
processing.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We examined how changes in both valence (negative vs. positive) and arousal (low vs.
high) influence performance in tasks requiring executive control because recent research indicates that two dissociable
cognitive components are involved in the regulation of task performance: amount of current control (i.e., strength of
filtering goal-irrelevant signals) and control adaptation (i.e., strength of maintaining current goals over time). Using a visual
pop-out distractor task, we found that control is exclusively modulated by arousal because interference by goal-irrelevant
signals was largest in high arousal states, independently of valence. By contrast, control adaptation is exclusively modulated
by valence because the increase in control after trials in which goal-irrelevant signals were present was largest in negative
states, independent of arousal. A Monte Carlo simulation revealed that differential effects of two experimental factors on
control and control adaptation can be dissociated if there is no correlation between empirical interference and conflict-
driven modulation of interference, which was the case in the present data. Consequently, the observed effects of valence
and arousal on adaptive executive control are indeed dissociable.
Conclusions/Significance: These findings indicate that affective influences on cognitive processes can be driven by
independent effects of variations in valence and arousal, which may resolve several heterogeneous findings observed in
previous studies on affect-cognition interactions.
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Introduction
Affective states can be characterized by two independent
dimensions, valence and arousal [1,2]. Valence refers to the
hedonic tone of an experience ranging from negative/unpleasant to
positive/pleasant, arousal refers to a sense of mobilization and
ranges from low/deactivated to high/activated. All emotions can be
understood as combinations of these two basic dimensions [3].
Happiness, for example, can be conceptualized as a positive emo-
tional state involving high arousal, sadness as a negative emotional
state involving low arousal. The two-dimensional model of affect has
originally been derived from factor analyses of self reports of
affective states and multidimensional scaling of similarity ratings of
emotion-related language [1,4–6], and it has been shown that the
two-dimensional structure of subjective emotional experiences is
mirrored in peripheral physiological reactions which are also
differentially correlated along the two dimensions of valence and
arousal [7–9]. More recently, biological correlates for the two
dimensions of emotional experience have been found, indicating
that valence and arousal derive from transient alterations in two
independent neurophysiological systems. Valence correlates mainly
with activation of the orbitofrontal cortex and is associated with the
mesolimbic dopamine system, whereas arousal correlates with
activation of the amygdala and is associated with the mesencephalic
reticular activating system [10–13].
The independence of the affective dimensions of valence and
arousal has been demonstrated for emotion-related changes at the
levels of subjective experiences, physiological reactions, and central
nervous system activations. However, it is currently unknown
whether valence and arousal are also dissociable at the level of
emotion-related changes in cognitive processing, which represents
another central component of emotional reactions (e.g., [14]).
Although it has been frequently demonstrated that emotional states
are associated with changes of a wide range of cognitive processes
like, e.g., perception [15–18], spatial or temporal attention [19–21],
and memory [22–26], until now no study has investigated whether
effects of valence and arousal on cognitive processing are indeed
dissociable. To address the question of dissociable cognitive effects,
two requirements have to be met: first, a two-by-two crossed
manipulation of valence and arousal has to be performed, and
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second, two dependent variables have to be examined which reflect
independent cognitive functions. However, the existing studies are
limited on that point either in their manipulations or measurements.
Most of the existing studies did not investigate the full factorial
combination of negative/positive valence and low/high arousal
(e.g., [16–18,21,22,27,28]) and second, all but one investigated only
one cognitive function (i.e., one dependent variable). In particular,
even that one study which investigated two dependent variables did
not report dissociable effect of valence and arousal but effects of
valence only [19].
The aim of the present study was to address the issue of
dissociable effects of valence and arousal on cognitive processing. As
mentioned above, to investigate this question, a cognitive ability has
to be examined which depends on two independent cognitive
processes. We choose the area of adaptive executive control because
recent research suggests that the executive mechanisms involved in
the adaptive regulation of task performance can be dissociated in
two components: a control process which makes sure that only task-
relevant signals are selected, and a conflict-monitoring process
which determines how much control is exerted and when control is
withdrawn [29,30]. Empirically, the strength of control is reflected
by the amount of interference by task-irrelevant stimuli, and the
strength of conflict-driven control adaptation by the modulation of
interference after trials in which conflicting stimuli were present (we
use the terms ‘control’ and ‘control adaptation’ throughout the
article to refer to the theoretical cognitive constructs, and the terms
‘interference’ and ‘modulation of interference’ to refer to the
empirical operationalizations of these theoretical constructs). On the
basis of prior theorizing, we expected that arousal might influence
control whereas valence might influence control adaptation. It is
often assumed that one core component of high arousal is a strong
responsiveness to sensory stimuli [31]. Accordingly, high levels of
arousal might impede the filtering of task-irrelevant signals by
cognitive control. Valence has been assumed to modulate the
balance between goal maintenance and flexibility [32]. Accordingly,
higher levels of pleasure might impede conflict-based control
adaptation to promote cognitive flexibility.
In order to determine whether valence and arousal are
dissociable in their effects on control and control adaptation, an
empirical and a conceptual step are necessary: Empirically, it has to
be shown that valence and arousal differentially influence the two
dependent variables reflecting variations in control and control
adaptation, interference and conflict-driven modulation of interfer-
ence. However, there is no one-to-one mapping of the cognitive
functions of control and control adaptation to the empirical
variables interference and conflict-driven interference modulation.
Therefore, an additional conceptual step is to identify the empirical
conditions which have to be satisfied to conclude that differential
effects on empirical interference and conflict-driven interfer-
ence modulation can indeed be attributed to dissociable cognitive
functions, rather than to a combination of cognitive functions.
Empirically, to examine the effects of valence and arousal on
interference and conflict-driven interference modulation, we first
induced four different affective states derived by crossing the two
dimensions of valence and arousal: happiness (positive valence,
high arousal), anxiety (negative valence, high arousal), calmness
(positive valence, low arousal), and sadness (negative valence, low
arousal). Directly after affect induction, participants performed a
visual pop-out distractor task in which substantial interference
effects and conflict adaptation effects typically occur [33,34].
Observers were instructed to search for a pop-out target defined in
a specific dimension (a tilted among vertical gray bars). In half of
the trials, the search array contained an additional task-irrelevant
pop-out distractor defined in a different dimension (a white among
gray vertical bars). In trials in which the pop-out distractor is
present, search performance is typically slowed, which reflects
interference by salient, but task-irrelevant, stimuli [35]. After trials
following such a distracting event, interference is typically reduced,
which indicates that observers are able to adaptively modulate the
amount of current control by conflict-driven control adaptation
[30,33,34]. Neurophysiological evidence suggests that interference
and adaptive modulation of interference reflect independent
cognitive functions because different brain areas are involved: Pre-
trial activity in the medial frontal cortex is a good predictor for the
size of search interference on a trial-by-trial basis [36], whereas the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is related to adaptive control [30].
However, the independence of interference by salient distractors and
its adaptive modulation has not yet been demonstrated.
Conceptually, to establish the empirical markers which allow to
conclude that differential effects of valence and arousal on
interference and conflict-driven modulation of interference reflect
dissociable effects on the cognitive functions of control and control
adaptation, we explored the dynamics of a prominent formal
model of executive control [30]. According to this model, the
amount of current cognitive control is dependent on (i) the base
level of control, (ii) the amount of conflict in previous trials, and (iii)
the strength of control adaptation (for a detailed description of
the model, see below). Critically, based on the literature, the
conditions are unknown allowing it to distinguish whether changes
in the mean levels of control and conflict-driven modulation of
control originate from the change of one model parameter or a
combination of model parameters. Accordingly, we first explored
the control model’s system dynamics using a Monte Carlo
simulation in order to establish the conditions allowing to attribute
changes in mean control and mean conflict-driven modulation of
control directly to model parameters. Then, we examined whether
the conditions for dissociable effects on control and control
adaptation are satisfied for the effects of valence and arousal on
adaptive executive control.
Results
Affect Induction
Participants reported the expected differences in valence and
arousal after affect induction. Valence ratings were higher in the
positive-affect groups (happiness: M = 6.69, SE = 0.34; calmness:
M = 6.96, SE = 0.32) compared to the negative-affect groups
(anxiety:M = 4.50, SE = 0.45; sadness:M = 4.24, SE = 0.47), F(1,
98) = 39.0, P, 0.001, gp
2 = .29. Arousal ratings were higher in the
high-arousal groups (happiness:M = 6.00, SE = 0.36; anxiety:M =
5.54, SE = 0.45) compared to the low-arousal groups (calmness:M =
3.64, SE = 0.43; sadness:M = 3.76, SE = 0.33), F(1, 98) = 28.6, P
, 0.001, gp
2= .23. Within the positive-affect and negative-affect
groups, valence ratings did not differ, Fs , 1, and within the low-
arousal and high-arousal groups, arousal ratings did not differ, Fs, 1.
Pop-out Distractor Task
Interference. Outlier trials (Reaction Times . 1400 ms;
3.9%), the first trial of each experimental block (1.6%), and errors
(2.2%) were excluded from further analyses. To determined
interference effects, for each participant, we first calculated mean
reaction times (RTs) for distractor-present trials (RTdis) and mean
RTs for distractor-absent trials (RTno-dis). Interference was then
calculated by subtracting the two mean RTs: RTdis–RTno-dis. To
analyze interference as a function of induced affect, interference
effects were subject to an ANOVA with the between-participant
factors valence and arousal, and the within-participant factor block
(first vs. second block). There was a significant main effect of block,
Affective Influences on Executive Control
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F(1, 96) = 39.5, P , 0.001, gp
2 = .29. Interference strongly
decreased across the two experimental blocks (from 100 to 51 ms),
replicating previous findings that training substantially reduces
the size of attentional interference [34]. This main effect was
qualified by a significant block x arousal interaction, F(1, 96) =
8.0, P = 0.006, gp
2 = .08. Simple main effect analyses showed
that interference effects were stronger in high arousal states (M =
117 ms ) than in low arousal states (M = 83 ms) in the first block
(see Fig. 1b, left panel), F(1, 96) = 8.6, P = 0.004, gp
2 = .08, but
not in the second block, F, 1, indicating that high arousal initially
increased interference, but did not impair the down-regulation of
interference over training. The effect of arousal was not
accompanied by an effect of valence or by a valence x arousal
interaction, Fs , 1, indicating that the amount of interference was
only influenced by arousal, but not by valence.
Conflict-driven Modulation of Interference. To determine
conflict-driven modulation of interference, we compared interference
effects following distractor-present trials (Idis) with interference
effects following distractor-absent trials (Ino-dis). Conflict-driven
modulation of interference was calculated by subtracting the two
measures of interference: Ino-dis–Idis. An ANOVA with the within-
participant factor block revealed that a reduction in interference
after conflicting trials was only found in the first experimental
block, but not in the second block (51 ms versus 23 ms), F(1, 99)
= 11.8, P , 0.001, gp
2 = .11, replicating previous findings that
conflict-driven adaptation mechanisms are only at work as long as
the suppression of distracting stimuli is not fully established by
training [34]. Analyzing conflict-adaptation effects as a function of
induced affect only for the first block revealed a main effect of
valence, F(1, 96) = 5.2, P = 0.024, gp
2 = .05 (see Fig. 1b, right
panel). Conflict-driven interference reductions were larger in
negative states (M = 76 ms) than in positive states (M = 26 ms).
This effect of valence was not accompanied by an effect of arousal or
by a valence x arousal interaction, Fs , 1, indicating that conflict-
driven modulation of interference was only influenced by valence,
but not by arousal.
Figure 1. Experimental materials and results. (A) Examples of search displays in the control condition (left panel) and the pop-out distractor
condition (right panel). Participants were instructed to search for the tilted pop-out target and to ignore an occasionally occurring luminance pop-out
distractor. (B) Left panel: Mean interference effects (reaction time on pop-out distractor trials minus reaction time on control trials) as a function of
valence state (negative, positive) and arousal state (high, low). Right panel: Mean conflict-adaptation effects (interference on trials following pop-out
distractor trials minus interference on trials following control trials) as a function of valence state (negative, positive) and arousal state (high, low).
Error bars indicate standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029287.g001
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Error Rates. We also examined whether induced affect
influenced error rates. Overall, both affective effects on inter-
ference (all Ps. .09) and conflict-driven modulation of interference
(all Ps. .24) for error rates were not modulated by affect condition.
Practice Task. To analyze whether the four affect induction
groups might have differed already before affect induction, RTs in
the practice task before affect induction were subject to an analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with the between-subjects factors valence
(positive vs. negative) and arousal (low vs. high). Mean RT was
806 ms and was unaffected by valence and arousal (all Fs , 1.5,
all Ps . 0.21). The same ANOVA of error rates also revealed no
significant effects (mean error rate 2.7%, all Fs , 1.17, all Ps .
0.28). That is, there were no significant differences between
participants subsequently assigned to the different affect induction
groups.
Dissociability of Control and Control Adaptation
Monte Carlo Simulation. To establish the empirical
conditions of when differential effects on interference and on
conflict-driven modulation of interference can be attributed to
dissociable cognitive functions, we explored Botvinick et al’s [29]
model of executive control using a Monte Carlo simulation. We
simulated an interference paradigm in which a conflict was present
in 50% of all trials. Using the difference equation for conflict of [29]
Ct~l aEt{1zbð Þz 1{lð ÞCt{1,
where Ct reflects control at time t as being dependent of control at
the last point in time, Ct21, and a measure of conflict at the last point
in time, Et21. l weights the contribution of previous control
(stability) and previous conflict (flexibility) and thus reflects control
adaptation. b is the amount of control which is added at each point
in time and thus reflects the base-level of control. Parameter a in
contrast is not related directly to control, but modulates conflict, E.
That is, the same physical amount of conflict in the environment
can be amplified or dampened, depending on a. In difference to the
original formulation of the model, we exchanged the roles of l and 1
– l in order to allow l to be interpreted semantically as control
adaptation rather than cognitive stability/rigidity as would be
necessary in the original formulation. This alteration of course
leaves the model’s dynamics unchanged. In order to explore the
dynamics of executive control, we simulated an interference
paradigm for ca. 8000 parameter combinations of l, b, and a.
Each parameter was varied between 0 and 1 in 10 steps, except for l,
which was varied between 0.05 and 0.95. For each set of parameters,
control started with 0 and a random sequence of conflict and no
conflict trials was presented to the system. For conflict trials, the
conflict measure E was set to 1, and for no-conflict trials, E was set to
0. The mean level of control was calculated as the average control
over all 1000 trials. Mean control adaptation was calculated as the
difference in mean control between trials following no- conflict trials
and trials following conflict trials. Both measures relate to empirical
measures in interference paradigms. RT interference is inversely
proportional to mean control (the higher mean control, the smaller
RT interference), mean control adaptation reflects the reduction in
RT interference in trials following conflict trials compared to trials
following no-conflict trials.
Figure 2 presents how the parameters l, b, and a affect mean
control and mean control adaptation in the Monte Carlo
simulation. Mean control is affected only by parameters b and
a, but not by parameter l (see Fig. 2a). On the other hand, mean
control adaptation is affected by l and a, but not by parameter b
(see Fig. 2b). Put semantically, the higher the base-level of control,
b, the higher the mean level of control becomes, whereas mean
control adaptation remains unaffected. By contrast, the higher the
level of control adaptation, l, the stronger mean control
adaptation becomes, whereas the mean level of control remains
unaffected. Finally, a stronger emphasis of conflict (i.e., an increase
in parameter a) increases both the mean levels of control as well as
conflict adaptation. A pure variation of a leads to a near perfect
correlation between mean control and mean conflict adaptation.
For each combination of l and b, the correlation coefficient is
greater than .95 (except for the highest levels of l, where the
correlation coefficient is always greater than .85; see Fig. 2c).
However, the simulation revealed that if a is fixed and only l and
b are allowed to vary, there is no correlation between mean
control and mean conflict adaptation (see Fig. 2d), indicating that
l and b can indeed be dissociated when this condition is satisfied.
This holds true for every level of a, the correlation coefficients are
always below .01. In summary, it can be concluded that two
experimental factors have dissociable effects on adaptive executive
control if three conditions are satisfied: (i) one factor affects
interference but not conflict-driven interference modulation, (ii)
the other factor affects conflict-driven interference modulation but
not interference, and (iii) there is no correlation between
interference and conflict-driven interference modulation.
Dissociability of Valence and Arousal Effects
To examine whether the empirical criterion for dissociable
effects of two experimental factors on control and control
adaptation are satisfied in the present study, we correlated
interference effects with conflict-driven interference modulation
effects in the first experimental block. The analysis revealed that
both measures of executive control were indeed uncorrelated, r =
0.04, P = 0.647, indicating that the effects of arousal and valence
on control and control adaptation are indeed dissociable.
Discussion
It has long been claimed that affective experiences derive from
two independent basic dimensions, valence and arousal. Indeed,
based on introspectionist [5], semantic [4], and psychophysiolog-
ical [9] experimental frameworks, previous research has shown
that valence and arousal are indeed dissociable at the levels of
emotion-related changes in subjective experiences, physiological
reactions, and central nervous system activations. The results of
the present study demonstrate that valence and arousal can also be
dissociated at the level of emotion-related changes in cognitive
processing. Using a visual pop-out distractor task, we found that
valence and arousal differentially influenced the two basic
requirements of adaptive executive control: Control (i.e., strength
of filtering goal-irrelevant signals) and control adaptation (i.e.,
strength of maintaining current goals over time). Involuntary
attentional capture by goal-irrelevant pop-out distractors was
largest in high arousal states, independently of valence, indicating
that arousal, but not valence, modulates control. By contrast, the
increase in control after trials in which goal-irrelevant stimuli were
present was largest in negative states, independently of arousal,
indicating that valence, but not arousal, modulates control
adaptation. A Monte Carlo simulation revealed that these
observed effects of valence and arousal on adaptive executive
control are indeed dissociable. The simulation revealed that effects
of two experimental factors on control and control adaptation are
dissociable if there is no correlation between empirical interference
and the conflict-driven modulation of interference, which was
indeed the case in our study.
The finding that distraction by goal-irrelevant pop-out dis-
tractors was highest in happy states and lowest in sad states
Affective Influences on Executive Control
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corroberates other findings demonstrating that negative affect
compared to positive affect broadens selective processing in
different cognitive domains like, e.g., iconic memory [16], spatial
attention [37], semantic memory [38], or action representation
[39], and is consistent with the broaden-and-build theory [40]
positing that one of the primary function of positive affect is to
broaden a person’s thought-action repertoire and to build personal
resources by making people more open-minded and more sensible
for opportunities in the environment. Our results suggests,
however, that such affective influences on the breadth of selective
processing can be driven by independent effects of variations in the
two underlying dimensions of valence and arousal. Accordingly,
depending on the demands a task makes on executive control,
selective processing can be broadened either due to a weak level
of attentional control, due to a weak level of control adaptation,
or both.
Indeed, this might also account for the rather heterogeneous
findings observed in the few studies investigating the full factorial
combination between positive/negative valence and high/low
arousal. For instance, studies using false memory tasks or semantic
generation tasks suggest that the breadth of processing is modu-
lated by arousal rather than by valence, because false memories or
unusual word-associations are more frequent in high than in low
arousal states, irrespective of their valence [25,38]. By contrast,
studies using attentional blink tasks suggest that arousal and valence
interact in their effects on the breadth of processing because sadness
seems to broaden processing (i.e., reduce the attentional blink),
whereas anxiety seems to narrow processing (i.e., enhance the
attentional blink), with calm and happy states in-between [20].
However, this mixed pattern of results is not surprising as the
requirements for executive control are rather different between both
type of tasks. The occurrence of false memories and the production
of unusual associates should only vary with the level of control
because both phenomenons depend on the activation of irrelevant
signals which is not experienced as a conflict [41]. Accordingly,
performance should be influenced by arousal rather than by
valence. By contrast, the size of the attentional blink depends both
on the level of control and on the level of control adaptation.
Attentional blink effects are stronger if there is an overinvestment of
general attentional resources in the task because this increases
interference by task-irrelevant items of the rapidly presented
sequence of stimuli [42]. Accordingly, attentional blink should be
modulated by valence because the strength of maintaining current
attentional goals over time varies depending on valence. However,
Figure 2. Results of the Monte Carlo simulation of Botvinick et al’s (30) model of control. (A) Effect of the parameters b, l, and a on mean
control. (B) Effect of b, l, and a on mean control adaptation. (C) Correlation between mean control and mean control adaptation for fixed b, l with
variable a. (D) Correlation between mean control and mean control adaptation for a fixed level of a.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029287.g002
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the amount of interference when paying a high amount of attention
to the task should additionally vary with arousal because the base
level of control should depend on arousal.
Our results indicate that interference by task-irrelevant stimuli
can be large both in high-arousal positive states and in high-
arousal negative states. At a first glance, this might seem surprising
as it has been hypothesized that high arousal in negative states is
associated with a constriction of attentional focus, leading to a
focusing on task-relevant cues and an exclusion of task-irrelevant
cues (i.e., cue-utilization hypothesis; [43]). A prominent example
thereof is the so-called ‘‘weapon focus’’ which refers to the
phenomenon that attention in high arousing situations like an
attack is narrowed to central details (i.e., the weapon) at the
expense of peripheral details [44]. However, more recently, it has
been suggested that such attentional narrowing is not inevitably
produced by high-arousal negative states. Instead, such effects
seem only to occur if central stimuli are highly salient [45]. In line
with these findings, our study demonstrates that high arousal in
negative states is not inevitably associated with a narrowing of
attentional focus. By contrast, at least if task-irrelevant stimuli are
salient, then high arousal seems even to broaden attention. In
particular, this would suggest that the critical dimension
influencing attentional selection of cues in highly arousing
situation is not goal-driven task relevance, but rather stimulus-
driven salience of a stimulus. Indeed, determining the role of
salience in emotional effects on attention might be an interesting
avenue for future research.
The possible critical role of salience of task-irrelevant stimuli
might also explain why the only one existing study examining the
influence of valence and arousal on control and control adaptation
did not report dissociable effect of valence and arousal [19]. Using
a flanker task [46], it was found that observers in negative states
showed stronger control adaptation after a conflict than observers
in positive states, which is consistent with the valence effect in the
present study. However, different from the present study, the base
level of control was not influenced by arousal. The reason for the
failure to find effects of arousal on control might be that van
Steenbergen and colleagues used distractor stimuli with low
salience (i.e., different color words as targets and distractors).
Indeed, compared to the mean interference effects in the present
study (100 ms), mean interference effects in that study were rather
small (34 ms). Thus, one important prerequisite for the occurrence
of arousal effects on distraction by task-irrelevant stimuli seems to
be their high salience.
The finding of dissociable effects of valence and arousal in
adaptive executive control is well in line with findings demon-
strating that valence and arousal are associated with different
neurotransmitter systems which are known to differentially
modulate control and control adaptation. Valence is associated
with changes in the activity of the dopamine system (e.g., [47]),
which is assumed to play an important role in the modulation of
cognitive flexibility [48]. Arousal is associated with changes in the
activity of the norepinephrine system (e.g., [49]), which is assumed
to play an important role in alerting the cortex to attend to salient
sensory stimuli [50]. Accordingly, it might be that the effects of
valence and arousal on control and control adaptation are
mediated by effects of valence and arousal on dopamine and
norepinephrine release. Thus, one interesting topic for future
research is to determine the neurophysiological background of
how valence and arousal act on adaptive executive control.
The results of the present study replicate previous findings
demonstrating that training can substantially reduce the size of
attentional interference, and that conflict-driven adaptation mech-
anisms are only at work as long as the suppression of distracting
pop-out stimuli is not fully established [34]. Interference substan-
tially decreased from the first to the second experimental block, and
a decrease in interference after distracting trials was only observed
in the first experimental block. In particular, our results suggest that
although high arousal initially increases interference, it does not
impair the down-regulation of interference over training, because
effects of arousal on interference were found only in the first
experimental block. However, one might argue that the fact that no
effects of arousal were found in the second block might merely
reflect the fading of affect induction effects. Indeed, it is often found
that induced affect can fade relatively quickly, lasting typically less
than ten minutes (e.g., [51,52]). However, as our experimental task
was very short and lasted less than two minutes (first experimental
Block: M = 0.96 min, second experimental block:M = 0.94 min;
no break between blocks), it seems unlikely that the induced
affective state substantially faded during the experimental task.
The results of our study support dimensional models of affect
positing that all affective states derive from the two independent
basic dimensions of valence and arousal. Dimensional models of
affect are consistent with many recent findings from behavioral,
cognitive neuroscience, neuroimaging, and developmental studies
of affect (e.g., [53]), and the current study adds to this voluminous
body of research by demonstrating that valence and arousal are
also dissociable in their effects on cognitive functions. However,
there is still a debate whether all affective experiences arise from
the two underlying dimensions of valence and arousal, or whether
there is a core set of basic emotions which are distinct and
independent from each other (e.g., [54,55]). Indeed, one could
argue that the effects reported for the four different induced
affective states represent specific effects of the respective emotions,
although this would be the less parsimonious explanation. One
interesting question for further research would be to examine
whether affective states characterized by similar valence and
arousal values like, e.g., anxiety and anger, have similar effects on
executive control functions, because this would further support
dimensional models of affect.
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that the basic
dimensions of affect, valence and arousal, can also be dissociated
in their effects on cognitive functions. In particular, our results
indicate that affect-induced modulations of performance in tasks
requiring executive control can be can be driven by independent
effects of variations in the two underlying dimensions of valence
and arousal, which underlines the importance of investigating the
full factorial combination of valence and arousal when examining
affective influences on cognitive processing.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Design
104 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to one of
four affect conditions (happiness, anxiety, calmness, sadness). All
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and received either
course credit or monetary reward (8 Euro) for participation. Data
from four participants were excluded from analyses because their
error rate deviated more than two standard deviations from the
mean error rate, resulting in a final sample of 100 participants (67
female, mean age = 24.81 years, SD = 5.48). This research was
approved by the ethic’s committee of the University of Munich
(LMU), and all participants provided informed written consent.
Affect Induction
A standard affect-induction procedure was used that combines
music with imagination [56]. Participants were instructed to recall
in detail an autobiographical event while listening to music. The
Affective Influences on Executive Control
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music and the autobiographical event were either happy,
frightening, calm, or sad (details of instruction and musical
selections in [20]). Subsequent to affect induction, the success of
induction was measured using the affect grid [57], which assesses
current affect on the dimensions of valence (1 = extremely
negative, 9 = extremely positive) and arousal (1 = low arousal, 9
= high arousal).
Pop-out Distractor Task
Stimuli were presented on a 19 inch cathode ray monitor.
Stimulus presentation and response recording was controlled by
software purpose written in C++. In each trial, observers had to
report the identity of an orientation feature singleton (‘‘pop-out’’
target). In half of all trials, a task-irrelevant luminance pop-out
distractor could also be present and had to be ignored by the
observer (see Fig. 1a). Non-targets were upright rectangle forms
(bars) which had a gap either at the top or at the bottom of the bar
(roughly resembling the letter ‘i’ or an exclamation mark ‘!’).
Stimuli were 0.25u of visual angle wide and 1.25u high with a
luminance of 5 cd/m2. The orientation target differed from non-
targets in tilt and was oblique 15u either to the left or to the right of
vertical. In a pilot experiment set size was manipulated to ensure
that the 15u tilt target was efficient in the sense that increasing the
number of distractors to be searched did not slow search times
[58]. The irrelevant target differed from non-targets in luminance
(35 cd/m2). Each search display consisted of a homogeneous
arrangement of thirty-six bars placed on three (invisible)
concentric rings about a fixation point. The first, second, and
third ring had 6, 12, and 18 elements with a distance of 1.75u,
3.25u, and 4.76u from the fixation point. Targets were placed
randomly (uniform distribution) on one of the 12 locations of the
second ring, and the irrelevant singleton, if present, on one of the
11 remaining locations of the same ring. Observers had to indicate
by clicking a mouse button, whether the orientation target was of
the shape ‘i’ or ‘!’ as fast and as accurately as possible. Each trial
started with a fixation point (diameter 0.2u visual angle) for a mean
presentation time of 1000 ms (uniformly distributed between 800–
1200 ms). The search display was present until the observers
responded.
Participants first practiced the search task for four blocks of 32
trials each during which only targets were presented and
additional irrelevant stimuli never appeared. Afterwards, affect
induction took place, followed by two experimental blocks of 32
trials each.
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